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Abstract 
The  tax  provisions  covering  capital  gains  are  known  to 
cause  a  “lock-in”  in  the  sense  of  a  delay  in  selling  an 
appreciated  asset.  The  1993  deficit-reduction  act  adds  a  new 
incentive  to  hold  by  providing  a  50% cut  in  the  tax  when  an 
investment  in  certain  businesses  is  held  five  years  or 
longer.  The  reduction  is  from  a  top  rate  of  28% to  14%.  The 
reduced  rate  tends  to  weaken  the  lock-in  but  the  long 
holding  period  required  to  win  this  rate  tends  to  strengthen 
it,  with  detrimental  effects,  it  is  here  argued,  on  the 
liquidity  of  capital  and  the  optimum  allocation  of 
resources.  The  locks  have  simply  been  changed. 
It  would  be  far  better  to  go  immediately  to  a  14% rate 
after  one  year  than  to  delay  it  for  five  years.  This  would 
reduce  the  prevailing  lock-in  without  introducing  a  new  one. 
The  increased  liquidity  would  be  an  attraction  to 
prospective  risk-takers.  It  would  increase  the  inducement 
to  make  the  financial  investment  in  the  first  place  without- 
impairing  the  viability  of  the  real  investment  in  plant, 
equipment  and  employment.  It  would  encourage  growth  and 
long-run  revenue  and  might  even  produce  higher  short-run 
revenue  because  of  the  increased  inducement  to  invest. 
The  1993  act  also  failed  to  deal  with  two  aspects  of 
the  taxation  of  capital  gains  that  are  crying  for  attention: 
(1)  the  taxation  of  inflation-bloated  gains:  and  (2)  the 
calculation  of  taxable  gain  only  when  realization  occurs. 
Both  lacks  contribute  to  the  lock-in. 
This  paper  considers  all  three  topics. Changing  the  Locks  on  Capital  Gains 
It  has  long  been  maintained  that  the  capital  gains  tax 
encourages  holding  onto  appreciated  assets  thereby  raising 
the  price  and  reducing  the  volume  of  transactions.  This  has 
become  known  as  the  “lock-in”  of  capital  gains.  The  1993 
deficit-reduction  act  adds  a  new  incentive  to  hold  by 
providing  a  50% cut  in  the  tax  when  an  investment  in  certain 
businesses  is  held  five  years  or  longer.  The  reduced  rate 
tends  to  weaken  the  lock-in  five  years  after  purchase  but  - 
the  long  holding  period  required  to  win  this  rate  tends  to 
strengthen  the  lock-in  in  the  interim.  Detrimental  effects, 
it  is  here  argued,  result  from  this  new  incentive, 
especially  with  regard  to  the  liquidity  of  capital  and  the 
optimum  allocation  of  resources.  The  locks  have  simply  been 
changed. 
The  1993  act  also  failed  to  deal  with  two  aspects  of 
the  taxation  of  capital  gains  that  are  crying  for  attention: 
(1)  taxation  of  inflation-bloated  gains;  and  (2)  taxation  on 
realization  only.  Both  aspects  contribute  to  the  lock-in. 
Controversy  over  the  capital  gains  tax  is  one  of  the 
fixtures  of  recent  American  fiscal  history.  It  was 
rekindled  by  former  President  Bush’s  budget  proposals  early 
in  1992,  the  various  plans  that  surfaced  during  the 
presidential  campaign  of  that  year,  and  President  Clinton’s 2 
bill,  as  passed  in  May  1993,  followed  President  Clinton's 
proposals  in  keeping  the  top  capital-gains  rate  at  28% and 
cutting  the  tax  rate  in  half  on  profits  from  stock  purchased 
directly  from  eligible  small  corporations  and  held  for  five 
years;  with  the  effective  date  set  at  January  1,  1993.  The 
conference  report  that  was  ultimately  passed  by  both  houses, 
despite  initial  changes  in  the  Senate,  followed  the  the  same 
lines. 
The  pressure  for  a  revision  of  the  capital-gains  tax 
occupied  much  of  the  discussion  before  the  vote.  Rep.  Armey 
(R.  I  Texas)  wrote  in  April  1993:  "AS  the  budget  works  its 
way  through  Congress,  President  Clinton  continues  to  call  . 
for  ‘an  investment  recovery'  to  create  jobs.  Cutting  the 
capital-gains  tax  and  indexing  gains  for  inflation  are  the 
fastest  route  to  that  goal.  The  President  has  actually  asked 
Congress  for  a  limited  capital-gains  tax  reduction  -  his 
plan  focuses  on  long-term  investment  and  only  for  smaller 
start-up  businesses.  But  new  evidence  reinforces  what  many 
Americans  already  know:  Only  an  across-the-board  capital- 
gains  cut  would  provide  the  dramatic  employment  and  economic 
growth  Mr.  Clinton  craves."[l] 
An  across-the-board  cut  did  not  prevail  but  small- 
business  succeeded  in  preserving  its  place  in  the  tax  bill. 
Under  a  heading,  "HOW a  small-business  group  found  a  niche 
in  tax  bill",  the  Wall  Street  Journal  reported  just  before 
the  House  vote  in  May,  1993: 3 
“The  tax-bill  language  gives  investors  in  such 
specialized  small-business  venture-capital  firms  the  same 
50% capital-gains  tax  cut  proposed  for  other  small 
businesses  by  President  Clinton.  Also,  individual  investors 
could  defer  from  their  taxes  as  much  as  $50,000  a  year  in 
capital  gains  from  stock  or  property  sales  if  the  gains  were 
reinvested  in  minority  venture-capital  firms.  Corporations 
could  defer  as  much  as  $250,000  a  year.  The  House  Ways  and 
Means  Committee  estimates  that  the  measure  would  cost 
taxpayers  $320  million  over  five  years.“[2] 
This  points  up  the  main  issues  leading  to  the  1993 
changes:  Should  there  be  a  cut  in  the  capital-gains  tax;  if  I 
SOI  should  it  be  by  rate  reduction  or  indexing  or  other 
means ;  should  the  rate  be  affected  by  the  holding-period; 
and  should  it  be  a  targeted  or  an  across-the-board  cut? 
Pre-election Consensus on A Capital-Gains Tax Cut 
During  the  pre-election  period  of  1992  President  Bush 
maintained  his  position  in  favor  of  lowering  the  capital 
gains  tax.  His  opponent,  Governor  Clinton,  also  had  an 
element  of  the  same plan  but  it  was  narrowly  focused  on  the 
“enterprise  zone”  idea:  a  capital  gains  tax  preference  would 
be  given  investments  in  the  zone.  Although  Governor 
Clinton’s  announced  tax  plan  would  mainly  impact  family 
income  over  $200,000,  the  enterprise  zone  plan  would  tend  to 
place  the  program  as  a  whole  in  the  moderate  category-- 
perhaps  only  a  stone’s  throw  away  from  the  Bush  plan. 4 
President  Bush’s  plan  was  to  reduce  the  top  rate  to 
15.4%  from  28%.  The  main  claim  that  had  been  made  for  a 
similar  rate  reduction  plan  a  few  years  earlier  was  that  it 
would  raise  revenue  and  reduce  the  deficit.  This  time  the 
emphasis  was  on  helping  to  pull  the  country  out  of  the 
recession  and  contribute  to  long-term  growth  of  the  economy 
and  the  productivity  of  the  working  force. 
A  newspaper  report  in  October  1992  included  the 
following: 
“A  Senate  proposal  phasing  out  capital  gains  taxes  for 
investors  in  new,  small  companies  also  was  quashed;  it  was  a 
modest  version  of  Mr.  Bush's  top  priority  capital-gains  tax- 
cut.  But  under  the  bill,  investors  in  enterprise  zones 
would  get  capital-gains  breaks."[3] 
A much  stronger  position  was  held  by  Governor  William 
Weld  of  Massachusetts.  He  said: 
"I've  never  understood  the  rationale  for  the  capital 
gains  tax  in  the  first  place.  I  think  we  should  look  toward 
some  sort  of  phase-out,  both  federally  and  on  the  state 
basis."  [4] 
It  should  be  noted  that  President  Clinton's  enacted  tax 
proposals,  which  raised  some  income  tax  rates  to  36% and 
beyond,  do  not  notalter  the  existing  28% limit  on  capital 
gains.  This  has  led  to  suggestions  that  the  "richl'  in  the 
sense  of  those  who  enjoy  high  income  from  dividends, 
interest  and  salaries,  would  be  worse  off  under  the  plan 
than  those  whose  wealth  and  compensation  embodies  capital 5 
gains  that  would  be  subject  to  the  28% limit.  It  is  cheaper 
to  live  off  capital  gains  than  dividends;  and  this  creates 
incentives  for  firms  to  reinvest  earnings  rather  than  pay 
dividends.  This  is  more  so  in  the  new  law  than  in  the  prior 
law  which  had  a  nominal  top  rate  of  31%  (“nominalt’  because 
of  adjustments  in  deductions  and  exemptions  that  raise  the 
effective  rates  at  high  levels  in  both  laws). 
Significance of the Declining Rate Plan 
As  we  have  seen,  both  of  the  major  contenders  in  the 
presidential  campaign  proposed  a  reduction  in  the  capital 
gains  tax  rate  with  the  length  of  the  holding  period.  - 
The  economic  question  is  whether  any  time-declining  rate 
proposal  is  a  good  idea.  (The  contining  distinction  between 
short-term  and  long-term  capital  gains  is  a  different 
matter,  not  considered  here.) 
There  were  two  separable  features  of  President  Bush’s 
plan  :  a  reduction  in  the  rates  of  capital  gains  tax;  and  a 
reduction  that  gets  greater  as  the  holding  period  is 
increased,  up  to  three  years.  Both  features  could 
potentially  have  had  significant  effects.  President 
Clinton’s  declining  rate  law  is  narrower,  being  “targeted” 
to  a  particular  area  or  group. 
Under  a  proposal  of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Bentsen 
in  late  March  1993,  the  limit  on  the  small  business  tax 
break  would  have  been  raised  on  new  investments  in 6 
businesses  with  as  much  as  $50  million  in  equity  and  debt. 
(Senator  Bumpers  had  wanted  $100  million.)  After  holding 
for  5  years  the  top  capital  gains  rate  would  be  14%,  the 
lowest  rate  since  the  30’s.  The  eligible  gain  could  be  the 
greater  of  10  times  the  original  price  of  the  stock  or  $1 
million. 
At  that  time  there  was  concern  that  Clinton’s 
“sweetening”  of  the  capital  gains  proposals  would  not 
satisfy  the  advocates  of  Senator  Bumpers’  more  generous 
plan.  Also,  some  senators  were  concerned  that  to  keep  the 
maximum  capital  gains  rate  at  28% while  raising  the  personal 
tax  limit  to  39.6%  (36%  plus  a  10% surcharge)  would  v 
encourage  the  “game-playing”  that  the  1986  Tax  Reform  Act 
was  designed  to  prevent. 
President  Bush’s  rate  reduction  was  to  have  been 
achieved  by  excluding  a  portion  of  the  gain  from  taxation 
and  then  applying  the  existing  maximum  rate  of  28% to  the 
rest  of  the  gain.  Specifically,  with  a  holding  period  of 
one  year,  15% of  the  gain  would  be  excluded,  leaving  the 
remaining  85% subject  to  a  rate  of  28%,  making  for  an 
effective  rate  of  23.8%  against  the  entire  gain.  With  a 
holding  period  of  two  years,  30% of  the  gain  would  be 
excluded,  resulting  in  a  top  rate  of  19.6%  against  the 
entire  gain.  With  a  holding  period  of  three  years,  45% of 
the  gain  would  be  excluded,  making  for  a  top  tax  rate  of 
15.4%  against  the  entire  gain. 7 
Under  the  1986  tax  law,  capital  gains  were  taxed  at  the 
same  rate  as  ordinary  income.  The  exemption  of  capital 
gains  at  death  remained.  In  1990,  a  rate  preference  was 
established  with  a  28% ceiling  on  capital  gains.  Even  apart 
from  this,  a  substantial  advantage  remained  in  favor  of 
long-term  capital  gains:  An  asset  holder  could  defer 
realization  of  gains  indefinitely  or  until  lower  tax  rate 
years.  It  has  been  estimated  that  the  resulting  capital 
gains  advantage  remained  about  half  as  large  as  before  the 
1986  act.  (Cf.  Ferris  and  Reichenstein  1988).  Thus  two 
separate  tlclientelest'r  those  seeking  capital  gains  and  those 
preferring  ordinary  income,  for  tax  reasons  or  whatever,  . 
still  existed.  The  Bush  plan  would  have  enlarged  the 
capital  gains  differential  and  accentuated  the  separation  of 
the  two  clienteles.  This  was  reminiscent  of  the  pre-1986 
situation  when  there  was  a  60  percent  long-term  capital 
gains  exclusion. 
President Bush’s Earlier Proposal 
President  Bush's  earlier,  very  similar,  proposal  in 
1989  provoked  considerable  discussion  and  some  opposition. 
Herbert  Stein  was  vehement:  "The  whole  struggle  is  a  great 
waste  of  time  and  energy  for  the  president,  the  Congress  and 
the  country."  He  continued,  "There  is  at  best  only  slight 
evidence  that  cutting  the  tax  rate  will  have  the  positive 
effects  claimed  -  on  saving,  investment,  productivity,  jobs 
or  revenue.  In  my  opinion,  the  idea  is  logically,  morally 8 
and  economically  offensive  -  but  it  won't  kill  us.  The 
important  thing  now  is  to  get  it  over  with  quickly."[5] 
The “Lock-In” 
The  rate  reduction  in  the  Bush  plan  was  intended  partly 
to  overcome  the  "lock-in".  As  pointed  out  above,  this  is 
the  tendency  of  a  tax  that  is  imposed  solely  at  the  time  of 
realization  of  a  gain  to  discourage  the  sale  or,  at  least, 
induce  its  further  postponement.  The  rate  reduction  would 
unlock  built-up  gains  that  would  have  been  allowed  to 
accumulate  had  the  higher  rate  remained  in  effect. 
Not  generally  recognized  is  that  the  sequence  of  w 
reduced  rates,  as  the  length  of  the  holding  period 
increases,  introduces  a  "lock-in"  of  its  own.  This  new 
lock-in  is  apart  from  the  substantial  one  set  in  place  by 
not  taxing  gains  that  have  accrued  at  death. 
The  three-year  plan  thus  would  have  provided  a  "lock- 
in I1 incentive  for  a  three-year  period.  This  postpones  the 
acquisition  of  tax  revenues  and,  more  important,  it 
discourages  the  movement  of  capital  fo  its  highest  and  best 
use.  Under  the  plan,  there  would  have  been  an  incentive  to 
postpone  the  sale  of  appreciated  assets  from  a  top  rate  of 
28% to  23.8%,  then  19.6%  and  finally  to  a  level  of  15.4% 
for  assets  held  three  years  or  more.  Under  the  law  as 
enacted  a  rate  of  14% applies  in  five  years  in  targeted 
cases. 9 
Revenue Consequences of a Declining Rate Plan 
Would  an  extended  holding  period  increase  or  reduce 
Treasury  revenue  from  the  capital-gains  tax?  It  was 
reported  as  late  as  January  1993  by  authors  Bogart  and 
Gentry  that,  “Despite  extensive  research,  the  debate 
continues  as  to  whether  cutting  the  tax  rate  on  capital 
gains  increases  or  decreases  revenues”[6].  Using  an 
interstate  approach,  the  same authors  concluded:  “In 
general,  our  estimates  cast  doubt  on  the  popular 
justification  that  cutting  the  tax  rate  on  capital  gains 
income  would  be  self-financing”[6].  On  this  basis,  a  I 
reduction  in  capital  gains  rates  would  not  lead  to  a 
sufficient  increase  in  realizations  to  maintain  revenues, 
without  long-run  growth  induced  by  the  cut. 
Referring  to  the  Treasury  and  congressional 
staffs,  Martin  Feldstein  has  said:“Their  current  procedure 
allows  for  a  substantial  change  in  realizations  of  capital 
gains  when  they  estimate  the  revenue  effects  of  changes  in 
the  capital-gains  tax”  [ 71. 
It  is  useful  to  note  the  relative  unimportance  of 
capital  gains  taxes  in  the  total  picture.  Capital-gains 
taxes  account  for  a  relatively  small  share  of  U.S.  tax 
collections.  Alan  Auerbach  has  published  a  working 
estimate  that  they  constitute  about  10  percent  of  the 
revenue  from  the  individual  income  tax  and  4  percent  of 
total  federal  revenue  [8]. 10 
The  Bush-proposed  reduction  in  rates,  to  23.8%,  19.6% 
and  15.4%,  was  expected  to  unlock  gains  held  back  by  rates 
as  high  as  28%.  Even  if  there  were  a  single  drop  to  one  of 
the  lower  rates,  and  a  consequent  unlocking  of  gains,  there 
is  no  assurance  that  total  capital  gains  revenue  would  rise. 
It  all  depends  on  whether  the  increased  volume  of  sales  of 
appreciated  assets  would  be  sufficient  to  overcome  the  lower 
tax  rate.  In  short,  it  would  depend  on  the  elasticity  of 
revenue  in  relation  to  the  rate.  Substantial  discussion  of 
that  matter  occurred  in  connection  with  President  Bush’s 
earlier  proposals  and  the  result  was,  at  best,  inconclusive, 
as  Bogart  and  Gentry,  quoted  above,  have  suggested.  I 
The  important  point  is  that  the  plan  would  create  its 
own  lock-in,  an  inducement  to  hold  on  for  three  years.  The 
immediate  revenue  effect  could  well  be  negative.  When the 
plan  has  been  in  operation  for  at  least  three  years  we  could 
have  --but  cannot  be  sure  of--  a  sort  of  steady  state  in 
which  the  locking  and  unlocking  effects  would  counteract 
each  other,  with  such  net  unlocking  effect  as  an  overall 
reduction  from  the  28% rate  might  have.  Forecasting  each 
year’s  revenue  would  have  to  be  a  formidable  task.  The 
five-year  targeted  holding  period  that  was  enacted  in  1993 
aggravates  the  complexities  because  of  the  length  of  time 
involved. 
Efficiency Consequences of a Declining Rate Plan 
In  trying  to  determine  the  efficiency  effects  of  a 
declining  capital  gains  tax  cut,  it  must  be  emphasized  that 11 
any  resulting  increases  in  other  investment  income  must  be 
considered  as  well.  It  has  been  found  by  authors  Haliassos 
and  Lyon  (1993)  that  “reforms  that  reduce  the  capital  gains 
tax  rate,  offset  by  increases  in  the  tax  rate  on  other 
investment  income,  reduce  efficiency”  [emphasis  in  the 
original]  [9].  Apart  from  immediate  revenue,  what  is 
important  is  that  illiquidity  is  introduced  into  the  capital 
market  by  a  declining  rate  plan,  whether  three-year  or  five- 
year,  with  consequences  for  economic  efficiency. 
Growth Consequences of a Declining Rate Plan 
Herbert  Stein  pointed  out  in  1992  that  President 
Bush’s  proposal  to  cut  the  capital  gains  tax  was  a  long-run- 
growth  remedy,  not  a  cyclical  solution: 
“Mr.  Bush  has  never  said  . ..that  his  capital  gains  tax 
should  wait  until  we  are  in  a  recession  and  employment  is 
low  or  that  it  should  be  withdrawn  if  the  economy  recovers 
rapidly  and  we  regain  full  employment. 
“The  capital  gains  proposal  is  a  proposal  to  raise  the 
rate  of  growth  of  output  per  hour  of  work  by  increasing  the 
rate  of  saving  or  improving  its  allocation.  It  is  not 
designed  as  a  job-creating  measure,  even  if  the  claims  for 
it  are  valid.  It  might,  if  fortuitously  adopted  at  an 
appropriate  stage  of  the  business  cycle,  have  a  temporary 
job-creating  effect,  although  even  this  is  doubtful,  since 
the  proposal  is  usually  presented  as  part  of  a  total  budget 
package,  including  cuts  in  expenditures  and  in  the 
deficit.“[lO] 12 
Whether  the  lllock-intl  under  a  three-phase  declining 
rate  plan  would  have  induced  investment  and  employment  and 
improved  productivity  would  have  been  influenced  by  several 
considerations.  The  prospect  of  ultimately  being  subject 
to  a  tax  of  15.4%  instead  of  28% has  to  be  an  inducement  to 
invest:  it  is  like  ensuring  a  higher  prospective  rate  of 
return  on  an  investment.  It  does  not  affect  the  dollar 
returns  year  by  year,  which  would  continue  to  be  subject  to 
the  regular  income  tax,  but  to  the  prospective  pot  of  gold 
at  the  end,  when  the  asset  is  sold  at  an  expected  profit. 
Included  in  any  calculation  of  ultimate  outcome  must  be 
the  possibility  of  a  loss  rather  than  a  gain.  If  there  is  a- 
capital  loss  when  the  investment  is  liquidated,  the  tax 
benefit  of  the  loss  is  correspondingly  reduced  by  the  lower 
rates  because  the  loss  is  first  offset  against  gains,  saving 
the  tax  on  those  gains;  the  lower  that  tax  the  less  the 
benefit  of  the  loss.  The  existing  offset  (up  to  $3000  a 
year)  against  ordinary  income  is  only  for  a  net  loss  after 
offsetting  all  capital  losses  against  all  capital  gains.  To 
the  extent  that  capital  investment  is  induced  by  the 
expected  annual  income  rather  than  an  ephemeral  pot  of  gold 
at  the  end,  the  lower  tax  rates  on  gain  may  have  very  little 
effect.  In  other  words,  in  the  decision  to  invest,  high 
probabilities  may  be  attached  to  the  annual  income  and  very 
low  probabilities  to  the  possibility  of  a  gain  when  the 
asset,  or  what  is  left  of  it,  is  ultimately  sold. 13 
Authors  Hallman  and  Haubrich  (1992)  also  point  out, 
“Cutting  the  capital  gains  tax  rate...would  increase  [the] 
bias  against  dividends.  “[ll]  The  reference  is  to  the  fact 
that  the  preferential  tax  treatment  of  capital  gains 
discourages  dividends  and  encourages  retained  earnings  since 
the  latter  will  ultimately  have  to  pay  only  the  preferential 
capital  gains  tax  rather  than  the  higher  tax  on  dividend 
income.  A  reduction  in  the  capital  gains  tax  (especially 
with  higher  income  tax  rates)  would  strengthen  this  effect. 
A Capital Gains Tax Cut Will  Take Time to Work 
Whatever  its  merits,  no-one  should  be  deluded  into 
thinking  that  a  capital  gains  tax  cut  will  work  wonders  I 
overnight.  Herbert  Stein,  as  quoted  above,  has  quite 
rightly  cautioned  that  it  is  a  long-run  proposition,  not  a 
remedy  for  cyclical  unemployment.  This  is  not  to  belittle 
the  provision  but  rather  to  direct  attention  to  other 
changes  that  might  have  to  be  relied  on  to  solve  the  short 
run  problems. 
Targeted Capital Gains Tax Reductions 
When President  Clinton’s  capital  gains  plan  finally 
came  out,  at  the  end  of  February  1993,  it  provided  that 
investors  in  the  business  could  exclude  50% of  the  gain  on 
any  original-issue  small-business  stock  held  for  at  least 
five  years.  It  also  imposed  a  l(capM  in  that  the  provision 
was  limited  to  the  greater  of  10  times  the  original  price  of 
the  stock  or  $1  million.  The  original  proposal  of  Senator 
Dale  Bumpers  (D.,  Ark),  which  inspired  the  Clinton  plan, 14 
contained  no  such  limitation.  Another  cap  put  the  ceiling 
of  eligible  businesses  at  $25  million  capitalization  in  debt 
and  equity  (compared  with  $100  million  under  Sen.  Bumpers' 
legislation). 
As  an  inferior  alternative,  an  owner  might  wait  out  the 
five-year  period  by  leasing  the  business  to  others  and  then 
enjoying  the  tax  benefit  at  the  end  of  the  five-year  period. 
During  the  1992  election  campaign  it  had  become 
evident  that  a  "targeted"  reduction  in  the  capital  gains  tax 
was  within  the  prospectus  of  both  major  parties,  hence  was 
likely  to  be  enacted  no  matter  who  won.  The  target  could  be 
investment  in  a  small  business  or  any  investment  in  an  I 
"enterprise  zone",  or  both,  or  only  those  small  businesses 
located  in  an  enterprise  zone  or  "empowerment  zone". 
An  adviser  to  Governor  Clinton  had  written  during  the 
campaign,  "He  will  provide  tax  incentives  where  markets 
fail:  a  tax  exemption  on  half  of  the  capital  gains  from 
investments  in  new  businesses;  and  an  incremental  investment 
tax  credit  for  firms  that  increase  their  rates  of  investment 
in  plant  and  equipment".  [12]  The  investment  tax  credit  was 
later  dropped. 
Serious  doubts  have  been  raised  about  the  effectiveness 
of  a  small-business  capital-gains  tax  cut  unless  the  general 
business  environment  is  favorable.  The  mere  prospect  of  an 
iffy  capital  gain  and  a  reduced  tax  on  that  gain  at  some 
distant  time  down  the  road  (and  who  knows  what  changes  will 
be  made  in  the  meantime)  is  not  likely  to  be  a  strong 15 
inducement  to  invest.  In  the  context  of  a  euphoric  business 
environment,  however,  it  may  give  an  added  fillip  to 
investment.  The  capital-gains  tax  rate  was  not  raised  even 
though  the  regular  income  tax  rates  were  raised. 
The  subject  of  retroactivity  has  provoked  much 
discussion  after  the  income  tax  rate  increases  were  made 
retroactive  to  January  1,  1933.  For  future  use,  it  should 
be  pointed  out  that  retroactivity  for  any  cuts  in  taxation 
would  be  essential  to  prevent  a  halt  in  private  spending  and 
investment.  In  the  post-election  period  prior  to  the  State 
of  the  Union  message  it  was  reported:  “The  White  House  said 
President  Clinton  plans  to  include  an  investment  tax  credit’ 
retroactive  to  Dec.  3,  1992,  in  the  economic  proposal  he  is 
to  unveil  later  this  month.”  [13]  We were  also  informed: 
“With  indications  that  businesses  were  delaying 
equipment  purchases  so  that  they  would  be  eligible  for  a  tax 
credit,  Lloyd  Bentsen,  then  chairman  of  the  Senate  Finance 
Committee,  and  his  House  counterpart,  Dan  Rostenkowski,  said 
last  month  they  would  make  sure  any  investment  tax  credit 
would  be  retroactive  to  Dec.  3,  1992.“[13]  This  commitment 
to  retroactivity  of  benefits  back  to  Dec.  3,  1992  was 
repeated  a  few  days  later.  The  investment  tax  credit, 
though,  was  dropped  along  the  way. 
A Major Reform: Indexing for Inflation 
One  of  the  persistent  proposals  for  reform  of  the 
capital  gains  tax  is  indexing  for  inflation.  Some of  the 
present  tax  is  on  gains  that  merely  reflect  a  general  rise 1.  6 
in  the  price  level.  In  a  particular  case  there  may  be 
nothing  else  or  even  a  loss  in  real  terms  though  a  tax  is 
due  under  the  capital-gains  tax. 
The  simplest  approach  would  be  to  impose  the  tax  only 
on  the  gain  that  has  occurred  in  excess  of  inflation  during 
the  holding  period.  For  instance,  if  the  asset  rose  in 
price  from  $100  to  $150  during  the  holding  period,  while  the 
general  price  level  rose  20%,  the  taxable  portion  of  the 
gain  would  be  only  $30.  The  basis  was  raised  from  $100  to 
$120  and  the  gain  was  measured  from  that  number. 
A problem  arises  if  the  taxable  portion  of  the  gain  is 
then  subjected  to  the  regular  income  tax  brackets.  Some of* 
the  latter  are  themselves  indexed  for  inflation.  Would  this 
mean  that  some  capital  gains  would  be  doubly  indexed  for 
inflation?  This  could  be  handled  by  having  a  separate 
calculation  for  capital  gains,  with  each  asset  having  its 
own  index,  depending  on  the  length  of  the  holding  period.  . 
Moreover,  instead  of  using  the  conventional  cost  of  living 
or  producer  price  index,  something  along  the  lines  of  a 
"wealth  price  index"  (Alchian  1977)  should  be  used  as  the 
deflator.  (Consideration  would  also  have  to  be  given  to  the 
deduction  and  exemption  adjustments  at  some  income  levels). 
In  commenting  on  President  Bush's  1989  plan,  Herbert 
Stein  mentioned  two  problems  in  1990.  First,  he  proposed 
that  the  inflation  adjustment  apply  only  to  assets  acquired 
after  the  inflation  adjustment  was  adopted.  His  reasoning 
was,  “Since  the  motive  for  the  change  is  primarily  to 17 
increase  the  incentive  to  make  a  certain  kind  of  investment, 
there  is  no  point  in  rewarding  the  investments  that  already 
have  been  made.  The  adjustment  should  apply  to  assets 
hereafter  acquired.”  [ 141 
A  response  might  be  that  an  additional  aim  of  the  rate 
reduction  was  to  encourage  the  immediate  unlocking  of  gains, 
hence  revenue  contribution,  in  old  assets  that  have 
appreciated  in  value. 
(The  later,  1991,  Administration  proposal  primarily 
stressed  the  the  growth  aspects  rather  than  revenue 
consequences.) 
A  second  comment  by  Stein  in  the  1990  article  was,  ‘I... 
if  we  are  going  to  relieve  inflationary  gains  from  taxation, 
what  are  we  going  to  do  about  inflationary  losses?U1  He 
expressed  the  opinion  that  there  should  be  a  tax  credit  for 
an  inflationary  loss,  i.e.  a  loss  in  real  value  at  the  time 
of  redemption  [or,  perhaps,  any  market  sale  before  then?]. 
The  llcredit”  would  presumably  not  be  a  “credit”  against  tax 
liability  but  more  like  the  present  loss  offset  against 
gains  and,  to  a  limited  extent  ($3000/yr),  against  ordinary 
income.  He  pointed  out  that  the  real  burden  of  the  public 
debt  would  have  correspondingly  been  reduced  to  the 
Treasury.  He  acknowledged  that  the  nominal  interest  rate 
would  have  been  inflated  to  a  level  higher  than  the  real 
rate  (e.g.,  10% as  compared  with  a  5% real  rate)  if 
inflation  had  been  anticipated.  As  he  pointed  out,  however, 
the  entire  income  had  been  subject  to  annual  income  tax. :  18 
The  key  is  whether  the  inflation  was  anticipated.  An 
investor  who  unexpectedly  experiences  inflation  may  not 
have  a  built-in  cushion  to  reimburse  himself  for  a  rise  in 
the  general  price  level,  hence  for  the  decline  in  real  value 
that  he  might  experience  at  redemption. 
Some lawyers  have  argued  that  the  President  already  has 
the  authority  to  order  the  Treasury  to  institute  indexing  of 
capital  gains,  without  benefit  of  Congress.  One  of  these 
was  Charles  J.  Cooper,  formerly  an  assistant  attorney 
general  in  the  Reagan  administration.  He  has  said: 
“Unless  clearly  forbidden  by  Congress,  Treasury  can 
interpret  the  Tax  Code  to  define  cost  as  adjusted  for  * 
inflation;  that  is,  it  can  index  capital  gains.”  [15]  He 
has  presented  a  plausible  legal  case  for  this  position. 
On  the  executive  decision  he  has  said: 
If . ..If  there  are  responsible  legal  arguments  on  both  sides 
of  the  issue,  shouldn’t  the  lawyers  retreat  from  the  field 
and  free  the  president  to  make  the  decision  that,  in  his 
view,  best  serves  the  nation’s  interests?1’[16] 
Strong  public  presssure  was  put  on  President  Bush  to 
index  gains  by  executive  action.  In  an  open  letter, 
about  twenty  experts  said: 
“To  decrease  tax  rates  on  capital  and  to  stimulate 
investment,  we  urge  you  to: 
"1.  Direct  the  secretary  of  treasury  to  index  capital 
gains  and  depreciation  for  inflation.  For  both  capital  gains 
and  depreciation,  the  “cost  basis”  is  determined  not  in 19 
legislation  but  in  regulation.  The  secretary  of  treasury 
could  cut  tax  rates  on  capital  simply  by  defining  the  cost 
basis  as  the  original  cost  adjusted  for  inflation.  This  not 
only  would  promote  economic  growth  but  would  end  the 
practice  of  requiring  people  to  pay  taxes  on  phony  gains 
attributable  to  inflation.“[l7] 
The  Justice  Department  finally  issued  an  opinion  that 
the  President  did  not  have  the  power  to  index  the  capital 
gains  tax  by  executive  action. 
Treatment of Cash and Bank Deposits 
The  question  arises:  Should  not  those  who  llinvest’O  in  0 
cash  and  bank  deposits  also  be  protected  against  inflation? 
The  logic  is  a  little  twisted  here  since  the  indexing 
procedure  is  to  avoid  taxing  investors  on  what  they 
nominally  gained  from  inflation.  Cash  does  not  provide  a 
taxable  profit  or  loss.  But  why  not  a  “loss  offset”  to 
compensate  for  the  real  value  loss  suffered  from  investing 
in  cash?  In  1990  Herbert  Stein  (181  suggested  a  loss  offset 
equal  to  the  inflationary  loss  of  purchasing  power.  For 
instance,  in  case  of  a  5% inflation,  a  $5  loss  offset  would 
be  recognized  per  annum  for  every  $100  of  cash  or  non- 
interest  bearing  deposits. 
This  might  be  a  little  hard  for  revenue-seeking 
legislators  to  swallow.  A person  who  chooses  cash  rather 
than  an  earning  asset  is  going  for  the  various  advantages  of 
cash  (such  as  liquidity  and  the  chance  to  time  an  earning 20 
investment).  Should  the  Treasury  bear  part  of  the  cost  of 
this  decision? 
A more  serious  consideration,  though,  is  this:  If 
everyone  is  protected  against  inflation,  who  will  fight  it? 
With  no-one  left  to  fight  inflation,  what  would  prevent  a 
runaway  inflation?  The  Federal  Reserve  can  pursue  its  goal 
of  price  stability  only  because  it  has  a  large  supporting 
constituency  in  that  objective.  Tax  indexing  penalizes  the 
government  for  inflationary  policies  and  simultaneously 
weakens  the  public’s  opposition  to  such  policies. 
A Radical Reform: Taxing Accruals Rather than Sales 
The  holding  period  and  indexing  problems  are  not  the  - 
only  matters  that  warrant  attention.  The  declining-  rate 
proposals  and  the  indexing  of  the  capital  gains  tax  for 
inflation  may  appear  to  be  sufficiently  radical  reforms  of 
the  capital  gains  tax.  Yet  there  is  another  even  more 
radical  change  that  has  been  proposed. 
By  way  of  background,  we may  refer  to  a  review  by  the 
I.  M.  F.  in  which  the  treatment  of  capital  gains  in  the 
American  tax  system  is  summarized  as  follows: 
II . ..although  the  1986  Tax  reform  Act  raised  the  tax  rate  on 
capital  gains  to  that  levied  on  ordinary  income  [later  kept 
at  a  28% limit  despite  other  rate  increases],  capital  gains 
still  receive  preferential  tax  treatment  because  (1)  only 
capital  gains  actually  realized  (as  opposed  to  those 
accrued)  are  taxed,  (2)  capital  gains  on  inherited  assets 
are  not  taxed  [but  the  full  market  value  at  death  is  subject 21 
to  estate  tax];  and  (3)  the  effective  tax  rate  on  capital 
gains  from  owner-occupied  housing  is  close  to  zero.“[l9] 
The  first  two  of  these  points  are  dealt  with  here.  The 
third  point  (alluding  to  the  taxability  of  home  capital 
gains,  though  with  various  deferrals  and  deductions) 
reflects  a  strong  public  policy  in  favor  of  private  home 
ownership  and  is  generally  not  a  subject  of  controversy 
except  in  the  related  areas  of  whether  imputed  rent  on  home 
ownership  should  be  taxed  or  at  least  considered  in 
calculating  the  tax  burden. 
The  first  two  points  could  be  remedied  by  the 
conversion  of  the  tax  to  an  “accrual”  basis.  By  accrual  in- 
this  context  is  meant  that  the  tax  is  computed  each  year  on 
the  gain  that  occurred  that  year,  though  no  sale  has 
occurred.  It  would  be  paid  that  year  at  the  time  of  that 
year’s  taxes  or  on  realization  (in  which  case  it  is  paid 
with  interest).  In  some years  there  may  be  a  net  loss  which 
would  be  used  as  an  offset,  depending  on  any  limitation  that 
may  be  imposed. 
The  main  difference  from  the  prevailing  law  is  that  at 
present  the  tax  is  due  only  when  realization  occurs  and  only 
on  the  gain  between  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  the  holding 
period  as  a  whole.  No  interest  is  now  charged  for  the 
holding  period. 
Since  the  tax  is  paid  only  on  sale  or  realization, 
there  is  currently  a  tax  inducement  to  postpone  realization: 22 
the  investor  has  the  use  of  the  tax  money  until  realization 
even  if  the  aim  is  not  to  hold  until  death.  There  is  an 
inducement  to  pick  a  time  for  realization  for  tax  reasons 
(whenever  the  effective  tax  is  expected  to  be  lowest)  rather 
than  for  economic  reasons.  These  tax  considerations  must 
have  a  welfare  cost  by  distorting  the  optimal  timing 
decision  somewhat. 
To  tax  a  gain  when  it  occurs  or  accrues  rather  than  on 
sale  or  realization  would  impose  formidable  costs  of 
compliance  and  enforcement  because  of  the  problem  of 
valuation  of  an  unsold  asset;  and  it  would  impose  problems 
of  liquidity,  to  pay  tax  on  an  unsold  asset.  Vickrey’s  plan- 
[e.g.,  1947,  19921  would  leave  the  tax  payable  on 
realization  but  would  take  account  of  the  accruals  during 
each  year  of  the  entire  holding  period,  not  just  at  the  end. 
Auerbach  [1991,  19921  has  proposed  a  modification  that  would 
avoid  the  knotty  problem  of  annual  appraisal. 
An  accrual  system  would  ideally  avoid  a  lock-in  by 
making  the  tax  the  same whenever  the  asset  is  sold:  there 
would  be  no  incentive  to  hold  the  asset  longer  merely 
to  postpone  the  day  when  the  tax  money  has  to  be  handed  to 
the  Treasury.  The  idea  is  to  make  the  tax  burden  the  same 
for  a  given  inherent  gain  whenever  the  asset  is  sold. 
In  summary,  an  accrual  system  could  involve  (1)  an 
annual  tax  obligation  on  the  basis  of  the  net  growth  in 
value  that  occurred  during  the  year  and  payment  on 
realization  based  on  the  accumulated  obligations,  accrued  at 23 
interest;  or  (2)  the  same  idea  except  that  hypothetical 
figures  are  used  for  the  annual  valuations,  where  the  risk- 
free  interest  rate  and  the  assumption  of  t'portfolio 
optimization"  [20]  are  used  to  estimate  annual  valuation. 
Treatment of Capital Gains at Death 
The  exemption  from  capital  gains  tax  at  death  remains 
as  a  factor  to  consider  in  any  comprehensive  tax  change:  The 
exemption  provides  the  ultimate  incentive  for  a  lock-in. 
A balancing  of  competing  objectives  is  involved  here. 
On  the  one  hand,  there  is  the  perceived  need  to  avoid  a 
lock-in,  with  its  consequences  for  revenue  and  for  the 
optimal  allocation  of  resources  for  growth.  On  the  other,  * 
is  the  burden  of  searching  for  old  records  and  the  knowledge 
that  some  tax  may  be  imposed  on  the  estate  anyway.  The 
problem  of  records  was  partly  responsible  for  the  fate  that 
befell  the  short-lived  taxation  of  capital  gains  at  death  in 
the  70's.  [See  Pechman  19771.  The  exemption  leads  to  an 
inequity  compared  with  living  sales,  especially  sales  just 
before  death;  and  as  for  the  estate  tax,  the  exemptions  and 
deductions  might  mean  that  in  many  cases  the  capital  gain 
meets  no  tax  at  all  [Somers  19661. 
The  exemption  of  capital  gains  at  death  remains  as  the 
ultimate  lock-in.  Alan  Reynolds  has  pointed  out  that  if  we 
tax  capital  gains  at  death  we  would  have  to  repeal  the 
estate  tax;  otherwise  people  will  lose  their  family 
businesses  and  farms  [21].  Certainly  some  integration  of 
the  two  taxes  would  have  to  be  achieved.  The  exemption 24 
causes  a  lock-in  but  the  estate  tax  alone  does  not,  since 
death  is  (generally)  not  a  matter  of  selection  or  voluntary 
choice.  The  preferred  policy  would  then  appear  to  be  in 
favor  of  eliminating  the  exemption,  with  the  problem  of 
excessive  burden  to  be  worked  out  in  the  estate  tax. 
Problems to be Solved 
If  the  capital  gains  tax  is  to  be  overhauled,  these  are 
the  changes  that  call  for  attention:  (1)  institution  of  an 
accrual  system  that  removes  the  tax  as  a  factor  influencing 
the  timing  of  the  sale  of  an  asset;  (2)  indexing  the  tax  for 
inflation  in  a  manner  that  does  not  discriminate  for  or 
against  other  types  of  income;  and  (3)  some method  of  . 
eliminating  the  ultimate  source  of  lock-in,  the  exemption  at 
death,  such  as  a  full  credit  against  any  estate  taxes. 
Conclusions 
The  new  provision  that  cuts  the  capital  gains  tax  rate 
in  half  in  targeted  cases  would  tend  to  both  lock  and  unlock 
gains.  The  reduction  in  rates  would  tend  to  unlock  gains 
after  five  years  that  might  not  have  been  realized  because 
of  the  old  tax  rates;  yet  a  tax  schedule  that  reduces  rates 
drastically  after  a  holding  period  of  five  years’  duration 
would  tend  to  induce  a  five-year  holding.  To  what  end?  Why 
do  we  want  any  tax-induced  lock-in  of  the  financial 
investment  at  all?  It  is  hard  to  develop  a  reasonable 
economic  rationale  for  such  a  policy. 
The  aim  is  presumably  to  induce  a  real  investment 
in  plant,  equipment  and  jobs.  There  is  no  point  in  wasting 25 
any  incentives  on  holding  onto  the  pieces  of  paper  that 
signify  ownership.  Who cares  how  many  times  some  of  the 
pieces  of  paper  change  hands  after  the  real  enterprise--the 
purchase  of  plant  and  equipment  and  the  hiring  of  employees- 
-is  well  underway?  Only  in  case  of  a  complete  takeover  and 
restructuring  (which  happened  often  enough  even  under  the 
more  conventional  capital-gains  structure)  is  employment 
likely  to  be  jeopardized.  Merely  changing  the  ownership  of 
equity  paper  does  not  imply  loss  of  jobs.  Incentives 
without  holding  period,  such  as  the  Investment  Tax  Credit, 
could  also  be  used. 
Apart  from  the  new  small-business  provision,  there  is  . 
still  a  one-year  lock-in  for  the  28% rate.  A  shorter  net 
holding  would  be  subject  to  the  regular  income  tax  rates 
that  could  go  as  high  as  36% or  39.6%  or  even  more  for  some 
income  ranges  under  prevailing  provisions  dealing  with 
deductions  and  exemptions. 
The  targeted  requirement  that  investors  wait  for  five 
years  before  getting  the  reduced  rate  introduces  a  new  lock- 
in.  It  will  encourage  the  postponement  of  realization, 
hence  will  discourage  an  owner  of  the  company’s  securities 
from  selling  to  another  prospective  owner.  This  lock-in,  in 
itself,  has  no  economic  rationale.  Worse,  the  inherent 
impairment  of  liquidity  might  discourage  the  investment  in 
the  first  place.  To  what  end?  In  what  way  is  this  good  for 
the  economy?  It  discourages  the  free  flow  of  capital  to  its 
highest  and  best  use.  If  the  original  investors  sell  out  in 26 
a  year  or  two,  the  new  buyers  can  still  continue  the 
business  and  even  improve  and  expand  it.  If  the  business  is 
profitable  and  capital  gain  is  generated,  the  Treasury  may 
be  getting  some of  the  capital-gain  revenue  in  the  early 
years  rather  than  waiting  for  five  years. 
From  this  point  of  view,  it  would  be  far  better  to  go 
immediately  to  a  14% rate  after  one  year  than  to  delay  it 
for  five  years.  This  would  reduce  the  prevailing  lock-in 
without  introducing  a  new  one.  The  increased  liquidity 
would  also  be  an  attraction  to  prospective  risk-takers.  It 
would  increase  the  inducement  to  make  the  financial 
investment  in  the  first  place  without  jeopardizing  the  . 
durability  of  the  real  investment  in  plant,  equipment  and 
employment.  Though  the  short-run  revenue  effect  is  yet  to 
be  determined,  the  change  would  surely  encourage  growth  and 
long-run  revenue. 
This  conclusion  merely  says  that  a  cut  to  14% without 
an  extended  holding  period  would  be  welfare-preferable  to 
the  the  five-year  requirement:  The  holding  period  in  itself 
is  welfare-negative,  plain  and  simple.  Whether  any 
capital  gains  tax  is  inferior  to  an  equal-revenue 
alternative,  such  as  a  dividend  or  general  income 
tax,  is  a  separate  and  more  speculative  matter. 27 
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